ALASKA HOUSE BILL 22, SENATE BILL 35, SENATE BILL 11, & SENATE BILL 88

## COSTS AND RISKS OF PROPOSED PUBLIC RETIREMENT PLAN CHANGES

Prepared by:

Pension Integrity Project at Reason Foundation

In partnership with

**Alaska Policy Forum** 

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## About the Pension Integrity Project

We offer pro-bono technical assistance to public officials to help them design and implement pension reforms that improve plan solvency and promote retirement security, including:


- Customized analysis of pension system design, trends
- Independent actuarial modeling of reform scenarios
- Consultation and modeling around custom policy designs
- Latest pension reform research and case studies
- Peer-to-peer mentoring from state and local officials who have successfully enacted pension reforms
- Assistance with stakeholder outreach, engagement and relationship management
- Design and execution of public education programs and media campaigns

### Policy Objectives


- Keeping Promises: Ensure the ability to pay 100% of the benefits earned and accrued by active workers and retirees
- Retirement Security: Provide retirement security for all current and future employees
- Predictability: Stabilize contribution rates for the long-term
- Risk Reduction: Reduce pension system exposure to financial risk and market volatility
- Affordability: Reduce long-term costs for employers/taxpayers and employees
- Attractive Benefits: Ensure the ability to recruit 21st Century employees
- Good Governance: Adopt best practices for board organization, investment management, and financial reporting

# CHALLENGES FACING PERS & TRS

#### A History of PERS Funding (2001-2022)




#### A History of TRS Funding (2001-2022)




Source: Pension Integrity Project analysis of actuarial value of assets and actuarial accrued liability found in TRS valuation reports and ACFRs. 2022 figures estimated using reported losses of -4%.

#### PERS Liabilities are Growing Faster than Assets



Source: Pension Integrity Project analysis of actuarial value of assets and actuarial accrued liability found in PERS valuation reports and ACFRs.

#### PERS Investment Return History, 2001-2022



Source: Pension Integrity Project analysis of investment returns found in PERS valuation reports and ACFRs.

## Probability Analysis: Measuring the Likelihood of Alaska Plans Achieving Various Rates of Return

Probability of PERS & TRS Achieving A Given Return Based On:								
Possible	Plan Assumptions & Experience		Short-Term Market Forecast			Long-Term Market Forecast		
Rates of Return	Based on PERS & TRS Assumptions	PERS & TRS Historical Returns	Research Affiliates 10-Year Forecast	JP Morgan 10-15 Year Forecast	BNY Mellon 10-Year Forecast	Horizon 10- Year Market Forecast	BlackRock 20-Year Forecast	Horizon 20-Year Market Forecast
8.0%	40%	19%	8%	11%	17%	26%	52%	35%
7.5%	47%	26%	11%	15%	22%	32%	59%	42%
7.25%	51%	29%	13%	18%	25%	36%	62%	46%
7.0%	54%	32%	15%	21%	28%	39%	65%	49%
6.5%	61%	39%	20%	28%	35%	46%	71%	56%
6.0%	68%	47%	26%	35%	42%	53%	76%	64%
5.0%	79%	62%	40%	52%	58%	67%	86%	75%

## Probability Analysis: Measuring the Likelihood of Alaska Plans Achieving Various Rates of Return

#### PERS & TRS Assumptions & Experience

- A probability analysis of PERS & TRS historical returns over the past 21 years (2001-2022) indicates only a small chance (29%) of hitting the plan's 7.25% assumed return in 2023+ period.
- PERS & TRS actuaries calculate a 51% chance of achieving their investment return target each year.

#### **Short-Term Market Forecast**

- Returns over the short to medium term can have significant negative effects on funding outcomes for mature pension plans with large negative cash flows like PERS & TRS.
- Analysis of capital market assumptions publicly reported by leading financial firms (BNY Mellon, JPMorgan, and Research Affiliates) suggests that over a 10-15 year period, PERS & TRS returns are likely to fall short of assumptions.

#### **Long-Term Market Forecast**

- Longer-term projections typically assume PERS & TRS investment returns will revert back to historical averages.
  - ✓ The "reversion to mean" assumption should be viewed with caution given historical changes in interest rates and a variety of other market conditions that increase uncertainty over longer projection periods, relative to shorter ones.
- Forecasts showing long-term returns near 8% being likely also show a significant chance that the actual long-term average return will fall far shorter than expected.
  - ✓ For example, according to BlackRock's 20-year forecast the probability of achieving an average return of 7.25% or higher is about 62%, but the probability of earning a rate of return below 5% is about 14%.

#### HB 22 / SB 35 / SB 11 / SB 88 Issues


- Problem #1: Poor Plan Design
- Problem #2: Minimal Actuarial Scrutiny
  - Pension Integrity Project modeling of PERS and TRS through a standard stress scenario shows clear costs and added funding challenges that HB22 / SB35 / SB11 / SB88 may heap on the state
- Problem #3: Pension Cost Increases Coming
- Problem #4: Pension Swap Won't Solve Retention Issues

# RISK ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL 35 / HOUSE BILL 22

How would reopening the pension for public safety workers impact state debt and budgets?

#### Proponents Will Suggest Little to No Impact on Debt

Pension Debt Forecast: No Stress




Source: Pension Integrity Project actuarial forecast of Alaska PERS unfunded liabilities using market value of assets.

Scenario assumes fund achieves a constant 7.25%.

### A More Likely Scenario Reveals True Debt Impact

Pension Debt Forecast: Stress Return Scenario Applied



Source: Pension Integrity Project actuarial forecast of Alaska PERS unfunded liabilities using market value of assets. scenario applies recession returns in 2023-26 and 2038-41 and 6% returns in all other years.

### Long-term Cost Impact of HB 22 / SB 35

#### **No Stress**

	Status Quo	HB 22 / SB 35
Total Employer Contribution: Alaska PERS (2023-52)	\$13.3 billion	\$13.3 billion
Unfunded Liability: Alaska PERS (2052)	\$0.1 billion	\$0.1 billion
All-in Cost to Employers	\$13.4 billion	\$13.4 billion

#### **Standard Stress Applied**


	Status Quo	HB 22 / SB 35
Total Employer Contribution: Alaska PERS (2023-52)	\$20.4 billion	\$20.8 billion
Unfunded Liability: Alaska PERS (2052)	\$2.0 billion	\$2.4 billion
All-in Cost to Employers	\$22.4 billion	\$23.2 billion

## RISK ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL I I

How would reopening the pension for all public workers impact state debt and budgets?

### Impact of SB 11 on Alaska Pension Debt

Pension Debt Forecast: Stress Return Scenario Applied



Source: Pension Integrity Project actuarial forecast of Alaska PERS &n TRS unfunded liabilities using market value of assets.

Scenario applies recession returns in 2023-26 and 2038-41 and 6% returns in all other years.

## Long-term Cost Impact of SB 11

#### **No Stress**

	Status Quo	SB 11
Total Employer Contribution: Alaska PERS & TRS (2023-52)	\$17.7 billion	\$19.8 billion
Unfunded Liability: Alaska PERS & TRS (2052)	\$0.0 billion	\$0.5 billion
All-in Cost to Employers	\$17.7 billion	\$20.3 billion

#### **Standard Stress Applied**


	Status Quo	SB 11
Total Employer Contribution: Alaska PERS & TRS (2023-52)	\$28.5 billion	\$33.6 billion
Unfunded Liability: Alaska PERS & TRS (2052)	\$2.7 billion	\$6.8 billion
All-in Cost to Employers	\$31.2 billion	\$40.4 billion

## RISK ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL 88

How would reopening the pension for all public workers (with minor cost-saving measures) impact state debt and budgets?

### Impact of SB 88 on Alaska Pension Debt

Pension Debt Forecast: Stress Return Scenario Applied



## Long-term Cost Impact of SB 88

#### **No Stress**

	Status Quo	SB 88
Total Employer Contribution: Alaska PERS & TRS (2023-52)	\$17.7 billion	\$19.3 billion
Unfunded Liability: Alaska PERS & TRS (2052)	\$0.0 billion	\$0.5 billion
All-in Cost to Employers	\$17.7 billion	\$19.8 billion

#### **Standard Stress Applied**

	Status Quo	SB 88
Total Employer Contribution: Alaska PERS & TRS (2023-52)	COEMIIIAN	\$33.1 billion
Unfunded Liability: Alaska PERS & TRS (2052)	\$2.7 billion	\$6.7 billion
All-in Cost to Employers	\$31.2 billion	\$39.8 billion

## Main Takeaways

- Under a realistic return scenario:
  - HB 22 / SB 35 could cost the state an additional \$800 million.
  - SB 11 could cost the state an additional \$9.2 billion (PERS & TRS combined).
  - Despite cost-saving measures, SB 88 could still cost the state \$8.6 billion.
- Pensions are not the solution to Alaska's recruitment and retention challenges:
  - Recent polling of young public workers ranks retirement benefits well below other factors like compensation and quality of life offerings.
- DC Rates for public safety could be improved.
- Granting all employees access to the SBS-AP would make Alaska's retirement plans some of the best in the country.
- The current DC plan greatly benefits members who do not work a full career with the same employer.
  - There is a tradeoff here between making sure all Alaskans are best prepared for retirement and the "golden handcuff" of a DB pension.
- These proposals do not include sufficient risk-reducing policies to protect Alaska from runaway costs:
  - Minimal cost sharing
  - Not aligned with market expectations
  - No improvements to amortization policies